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Abstract
Earman and Ruetsche ([2005]) have cast their gaze upon exist-
ing no-go theorems for relativistic modal interpretations, and have
found them inconclusive. They suggest that it would be more fruitful
to investigate modal interpretations proposed for “really relativistic
theories,” that is, algebraic relativistic quantum field theories. They
investigate the proposal of Clifton ([2000]), and extend Clifton’s result
that, for a host of states, his proposal yields no definite observables
other than multiples of the identity. This leads Earman and Ruetsche
to a suspicion that troubles for modal interpretations of such rela-
tivistic theories “are due less to the Poincare´ invariance of relativistic
QFT vs. the Galilean invariance of ordinary nonrelativistic QM than
to the infinite number of degrees of freedom of former vs. the finite
number of degrees of freedom of the latter” (577–78). I am skeptical
of this suggestion. Though there are troubles for modal interpreta-
tions a relativistic quantum field theory that are due to its being a
field theory—that is, due to infinitude of the degrees of freedom—they
are not the only troubles faced by modal interpretations of quantum
theories set in relativistic spacetime; there are also troubles traceable
to relativistic causal structure.
1 Introduction
In a recent paper, John Earman and Laura Ruetsche ([2005]) have
taken to task a number of no-go theorems concerning relativistic modal
interpretations of quantum mechanics,1 on the grounds that the target
of such results “is not a full-blown manifestly relativistic quantum the-
ory, but a mixture of bits and pieces of ordinary nonrelativistic quan-
tum mechanics and relativity theory” (560). They suggest that a more
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fruitful avenue of investigation is to explore modal interpretations in
the context of fully relativistic quantum theories. Rob Clifton ([2000])
proposed a natural extension to this context of the usual modal rule
for picking out sets of definite observables. As Clifton pointed out
([2000], Prop. 3), this has the unfortunate consequence that there is
a norm-dense set of states for which the proposal picks out as def-
inite no observables other than multiples of the identity. The bulk
of Earman and Ruetsche’s paper is devoted to extending Clifton’s
result and to providing concrete examples of this trivialization. As
Clifton, and, following him, Earman and Ruetsche, have rightly em-
phasized, these trivialization results pose a serious problem for the
project of constructing a modal interpretation of a relativistic quan-
tum field theory. For Earman and Ruetsche, this leads to a suspicion
that the troubles for relativistic modal interpretations “are due less to
the Poincare´ invariance of relativistic QFT vs. the Galilean invariance
of ordinary nonrelativistic QM than to the infinite number of degrees
of freedom of former vs. the finite number of degrees of freedom of
the latter” (577–78). This seems to me to misrepresent the situa-
tion. There certainly are difficulties for a modal interpretation of a
relativistic quantum field theory associated with infinity of degrees of
freedom, as exhibited by the trivialization results. But there are also
difficulties associated with relativistic causal structure, as exhibited by
the above-mentioned no-go results. This matters because, faced with
the trivialization theorems, a would-be relativistic modal interpreter
might be motivated to bite the bullet and move to a theory in which
only finitely many degrees of freedom are associated with bounded re-
gions of spacetime, a move that finds independent motivation in claims
from workers in quantum gravity that a successful theory of quantum
gravity will have this property.2 The question then arises whether it
is possible to do so while retaining a relativistic causal structure, in
the sense explained in §2, below.
The no-go theorems that Earman and Ruetsche criticize make free
use of evolving states associated with spacelike hypersurfaces, of states
represented by density operators, and of one-dimensional projections
onto eigenspaces of observables. By contrast, the “really relativistic”
theories with which Earman and Ruetsche are concerned represent ob-
servables by Heisenberg-picture operators; states on this picture are
not states-at-a-time but are states defined on the entire quasi-local
algebra of operators associated with spacetime regions. Moreover, in
such theories, an algebra associated with a bounded spacetime region
will typically be a type III factor, containing no one-dimensional pro-
jections, and states on such an algebra will not be representable by
density operators belonging to the algebra.
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The point that the no-go theorems avail themselves of apparatus
that is either out of place or unfamiliar in a relativistic setting is well
taken. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a fairly simple point re-
vealed by the theorems criticized by Earman and Ruetsche, a point
that survives the transition to the framework of algebraic relativistic
quantum theories. The theorems do in fact show that there is a ten-
sion between modal interpretations and relativistic causal structure, a
tension that is independent of the problems for modal interpretations
of quantum field theories that stem from dealing with an infinity of
degrees of freedom. Further, the use of “chimerical” theories by the
authors of the cited no-go theorems can be defended. Such theories
involve a low-velocity approximation to special relativity that retains
relativity of simultaneity while dispensing with much of the other ap-
paratus of special relativity. It is possible to get clear the rules by
which pieces of relativity and non-relativistic quantum theories are
stitched together, and, having done so, we find that the no-go the-
orems go through in pretty much their original form. The chimeras
are quite tame, and useful servants in getting clear about the passage
from a really relativistic theory to a non-relativistic limit.
2 Relativity and causal structure
We are concerned with the question of whether modal interpretations,
formulated originally for nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, can be
rendered compatible with the special theory of relativity. A few words
are therefore appropriate about what is at stake.
The special theory of relativity is a theory of spacetime structure;
it is the theory that says that physical spacetime has the structure of
Minkowski spacetime, whose symmetry group is the Poincare´ group.
We need not get into an involved discussion of what it means to say
that this structure is the structure of physical spacetime, but at mini-
mum it should mean that the causal structure is given by the light-cone
structure—two events are causally connectible if and only if one is in
the past light-cone of the other. This is a striking difference between
Minkowski spacetime and Galilean spacetime. It is this feature that
gives rise to the relativity of simultaneity; given an event p, there will,
in Minkowski spacetime, be more than one maximal achronal surface
that includes p, that is, more than one hypersurface of simultaneity
of which p is an element.
It is this feature of Minkowski spacetime that poses a prima facie
threat of conflict with quantum nonlocality. It is also a feature that
survives the transition to the curved spacetimes of general relativity,
and which exists also in the discrete causal sets favoured by some
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researchers into quantum gravity.
If it is causal structure that is of interest, let us focus on that.
Assume that we have a spacetime on which is defined a relation ≺ of
causal precedence; ‘x ≺ y’ is to be read as ‘x is in the causal past of y’.
This will be assumed to be transitive and antisymmetric (no closed
causal loops). We define the relation of causal inconnectibility as
x ∼ y :≡ ¬(x ≺ y ∨ y ≺ x).
This relation is symmetric by construction and reflexive by virtue of
the antisymmetry of ≺. x will be said to be spacelike separated from
y if and only if x ∼ y and x 6= y.
In Galilean spacetime, if z is in the causal past (future) of x, it is
also in the causal past (future) of any event y that is spacelike sep-
arated from x. These two conditions are together equivalent to the
transitivity of ∼. For a Galilean spacetime, therefore, ∼ is an equiva-
lence relation, and the quotient of the spacetime by this relation is a
foliation of spacetime into hypersurfaces of simultaneity. In relativis-
tic spacetimes, on the other hand, ∼ is not transitive, and, in fact, for
any event x, there exist y, z such that x ∼ y and x ∼ z but y ≺ z.
The question of interest, or at least one question of interest, is
whether the interpretations we are concerned with can respect such a
causal structure, or whether, like the Bohm theory, they are compelled
to invoke a distinguished foliation and thereby a transitive relation
of causal inconnectibility. This, it seems, is the motivating question
behind the no-go theorems mentioned in the first paragraph.
3 The theorems purified
Modal interpretations, as originally formulated for non-relativistic quan-
tum mechanics, pick out at each time, for each system, a set of observ-
ables that are taken as having definite values. These, typically, will
extend beyond those made definite by the quantum state of the sys-
tem, but must nevertheless be sufficiently constrained so as to avoid a
Kochen-Specker obstruction, which would stand in the way of regard-
ing the quantum probabilities as mixtures over assignments of definite
values to these observables. Depending on the particular version of
modal interpretation considered, the set of definite observables will
either be a commuting set or—what amounts essentially to the same
thing—a set whose commutators have null value on the quantum state
of the system.
Suppose, now, that we want to extend the modal interpretation
to a relativistic setting. Relativistic quantum theories are typically
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formulated in terms of the Heisenberg picture (though, as we shall
see in section 4, below, it is possible to introduce a relativistic analog
of Schro¨dinger-picture evolving states). A modal interpretation can
be expected to pick, from these Heisenberg operators, a subset to be
assigned definite values.
Let us first consider what happens if we try to adapt a Bub-style
modal interpretation to a relativistic context. Such an interpretation,
as formulated for non-relativistic quantum theory, singles out some
observable to have definite values at all times. That is, at each time,
the definite observable will be represented by the same Schro¨dinger-
picture operator. Translated into the the Heisenberg picture, observ-
ables definite at different times will be represented by operators related
by temporal evolution.
We associate with a bounded, open spacetime region X an algebra
A(X), whose self-adjoint part represents observables measurable in
X. Let A, B, C, D be mutually disjoint, bounded open regions of
spacetime, with A ∼ B, A ∼ D, C ∼ B, C ∼ D, and suppose there is
a timelike translation T that takes A into C and B into D. Let ρ be
a state on A(A ∪ B ∪ C ∪D). Consider operators RA ∈ A(A), RB ∈
A(B), RC ∈ A(C), and RD ∈ A(D) as candidates for observables
that are definite in state ρ. Let us suppose that we expect our modal
interpretation to recover, not only ρ’s expectation values for RA, RB,
RC , and RD, but also the correlations between the spacelike separated
pairs.
If X ∼ Y , and RX ∈ A(X), RY ∈ A(Y ) are projections
with definite values, then the probability in state ρ that
they both take on the value 1 is ρ(RX RY ).
This is the condition called the “Relativistic Born Rule” in Myr-
vold ([2002]), minus the unnecessary mention of spacelike hypersur-
faces. It can be satisfied only if there is a joint distribution over
definite values of {RA, RB, RC , RD} that yields ρ’s expectations as
marginal probabilities for spacelike separated pairs.
If, now, RC is the the time evolute of RA—relative to the time
translation T , the “same” Schro¨dinger-picture observable—and RD is
the time evolute of RB, these will typically not commute, and there
will be a host of states for which an assumption of definite values
for all of these observables will run afoul of a Bell inequality. More-
over, depending on the evolution along T , it may be the case that
the set of definite observables yields a Kochen-Specker obstruction.
This, stripped of apparatus foreign to algebraic relativistic quantum
theories, is the content of the no-go theorem of Myrvold ([2002]). In
the example used therein, the evolution imposed is such as to make
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the timelike related pairs of observables 〈SA, SC〉, 〈SB, SD〉 anticom-
mute, where the SX ’s are related to the definite projections RX by
SX = RX − (I − RX); the state is chosen to make the impossibility
of a joint distribution with the desired properties particularly easy to
demonstrate. The details of the example are, however, unimportant;
as long as the timelike separated pairs fail to commute, there will be
some states that yield correlations between the spacelike-separated
pairs that violate a Bell Inequality.
Restricting the set of definite observables to ones whose time-
evolutes commute does not seem to be a viable option, if the inter-
pretation is to achieve the goal of providing a sufficiently rich set of
definite observables to count as a realist resolution of the measure-
ment problem. This requires, at minimum, definiteness of certain
observables—pointer observables, and the like—represented by quan-
tum operators that undergo non-trivial evolution and hence are rep-
resented at different times by noncommuting operators. A straight-
forward extension of a Bub-style modal interpretation to a relativistic
context is, therefore, not a possibility.
How do modal interpretations that use the spectral decomposition
of a system’s density operator to pick out the set of definite properties
fare? Although, in the relativistic context, a density operator repre-
senting the state may not be available, Clifton’s prescription can be
substituted for the spectral decomposition rule. This reduces to the
familiar prescription when the state can be represented by a density
operator. The no-go theorems for density-operator modal interpre-
tations of Dickson and Clifton ([1998]) and Arntzenius ([1998]), and
the extension in Myrvold ([2002]) of the argument to such interpre-
tations, are thus readily adapted to interpretations that employ the
Clifton rule. As Earman and Ruetsche point out (566–567), it will
not do, in formulating a no-go theorem for such interpretations, to re-
strict one’s attention to situations in which the systems in question are
isolated (so that their Schro¨dinger-picture state evolution is unitary),
as, for such evolutions, the set of definite observables simply follows
the evolution of the density operator’s eigenprojections, and neither
a Bell inequality nor a Kochen-Specker obstruction will be forthcom-
ing. Translated into the relativistic context: for such evolutions, the
Clifton prescription picks out the same observable as definite in regions
A and C. Accordingly, the cited no-go theorems for density-operator
interpretations involve, as they must, not isolated evolutions, but sit-
uations in which the systems in question are coupled to other systems
(thought of as measuring devices, though this is of course inessential).
The coupling forces an evolution of the particles’ definite properties,
as picked out by their reduced density operators; given appropriate
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choice of initial state and coupling, it is not difficult to obtain sets of
definite properties such that no joint distribution can yield the Born-
rule correlations for the spacelike-separated pairs. Though the set
of observables picked out as definite in a region X depends only on
the restriction of the global state to the local algebra A(X), and the
prescription for picking out definite values selects, for each of these
regions, a set of observables that can be consistently assigned definite
values, the values assigned to these observables are also responsible
to the global state, if the Born-rule correlations are to be recovered
for spacelike-separated pairs of observables. The Clifton rule does
not guarantee that the observables picked out as definite in timelike-
related regions commute, nor that the global state’s correlations for
all spacelike-separated pairs of local definite observables be recover-
able from a mixture of joint assignments of definite values to these
observables.
The question arises whether states and evolutions of the sort re-
quire for these proofs, that is, states and evolutions giving rise to sets
of local observables that admit of no joint probabilites satisfying the
relativistic Born rule, will arise in physically realistic situations; per-
haps relativity (or something else) precludes states and evolutions of
this sort.3 The evolutions involved are local evolutions, imposed sepa-
rately on spacelike separated systems; the relativistic causal structure
does not forbid us from approximating such evolutions under suitable
laboratory conditions. The states employed in the proofs, however,
are states defined on the limited set of observables explicitly consid-
ered, not on the full set of degrees of freedom treated by a field theory,
and here there is room for worry that the theorems might not apply to
field theories. However, even if our most fundamental theory is a field
theory, in concrete applications to experiments we typically treat all
but finitely many degrees of freedom as negligible, and we take it that
the restriction of the state to these degrees of freedom can serve as a
stand-in for the full field-theoretical state. We want our interpretation
to yield the correct correlations in Bell-type experiments, involving
measurements made at spacelike separation on entangled systems. In
analysis of such experiments we are led naturally to consideration of
theories in which relativistic considerations other than the relativity
of simultaneity are disregarded. That is, we are led to consideration
of chimerical theories, aptly characterized by Earman and Ruetsche
as “ordinary QM, relieved of a privileged foliation of time slices, and
subject to the relativistic Born rule” (560).
The no-go theorems for the density-operator interpretations can
be thought of as applying, in the first instance, to such chimerical
theories. They are, however, of relevance to the viability of a modal
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interpretation of a relativistic quantum field theory. Suppose we con-
struct a chimerical theory by starting with a quantum field theory and
restricting our attention to a limited set χ of the full theory’s observ-
ables, say, by an energy cut-off beyond which we regard everything
as effectively negligible in the situation at hand. Suppose that the
modal interpretation of the full-blown theory picks out, for a state ρ
of a local algebra A, a definite subalgebra Dρ(A). Now consider a
subalgebra Aχ, and let ρχ be the restriction of ρ to Aχ, and consider
the definite algebra Dρχ(Aχ) that is picked out by a modal interpre-
tation of the reduced theory. If we can construct a no-go theorem
for a modal interpretation, restricted in this way to subalgebras Aχ
of the local algebras, then the would-be modal interpreter of the full-
blown theory is faced with a dilemma: either the definite observables
in Dρχ(Aχ), or some approximation to them, are among the definite
observables in Dρ(A), or not. If not, the interpretation runs the risk
of having too few observables to count as a realist solution to the
measurement problem. If there are, among the full theory’s definite
observables, some that approximate those of the chimerical theory,
the modal interpretation of the full theory is in the same boat as the
modal interpretation of the chimera, unable to recover the correlations
between spacelike separated pairs of definite observables as mixtures
of value assignments to these observables.
The Clifton-Earman-Ruetsche trivialization results suggest that a
modal interpretation employing the Clifton rule, applied to a quantum
field theory, will, for typical states, be caught on the “too few” horn
of the dilemma, picking out no non-trivial definite observables at all—
the extreme case of too few definite observables. This horn might be
escaped by, e.g. making a move to a theory in which only finitely many
degrees of freedom are associated with bounded regions of spacetime.
This will be of no avail in escaping the second horn, however.
Note that we have employed very little in the way of assumptions
about the spacetime structure. The same considerations would, in
fact, apply to a modal interpretation of nonrelativistic quantum me-
chanics that sought to recover expectation values from assignments
of definite values defined, not only on equal-time sets of Heisenberg
observables, but on sets including timelike-related Heisenberg observ-
ables. Suppose that A, B are open bounded subsets of a spacelike
hyperplane in Galilean spacetime, and C and D open bounded sub-
sets of a later hyperplane. The causal structure of Galilean spacetime
does not require RA and RD to commute, but if these are observ-
ables corresponding to quantum systems that do not interact with
each other, they will commute anyway, and similarly for RB and
RC . Then a Heisenberg-picture modal interpretation of nonrelativis-
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tic quantum mechanics that attempted to recover expectation values
from two-valued homomorphisms over a set of observables including
all of {RA, RB, RC , RD} and closed under commuting products would
run into the same troubles. An option that is available to the modal
interpreter in Galilean spacetime, that is not available to the modal
interpreter in a relativistic spacetime (that is, any spacetime without
a causally distinguished foliation), is the option of picking out, for
each time, a set of observables definite at that time, with the closure
and probability conditions restricted to equal-time sets of observables.
What options are left for the would-be relativistic modal inter-
preter? One option might be to try to pare down the sets of definite
observables, so that histories formed out of them are consistent histo-
ries, as is suggested by Dieks ([2000]). On such an approach, the set of
definite observables in a local algebra A(X) would not be determined
by the local reduced state ρX alone; some further restriction would
have to be invoked to ensure the consistency of histories composed
of them. Whether this can be done in a systematic manner while
respecting relativistic causality remains a possible avenue for further
research. One could also deny the assumption that there are local def-
inite observables intrinsic to bounded regions of spacetime, perhaps
by adopting a ‘radical perspectivalism’ (Dieks [2005]) on which the
definite observables are relativized to hypersurfaces of simultaneity.
This is the approach adopted by Berkovitz and Hemmo ([2005a, b]).
Discussion of the viability of such an approach is beyond the scope of
this paper.
4 Evolving states in a relativistic con-
text
We have seen that the no-go theorems need not make use of evolving
states associated with spacelike hyperplanes. Although relativistic
quantum theories are typically cast in terms of the Heisenberg picture,
which is a natural setting for a relativistic theory, it can be useful, for
some purposes, to reintroduce time-evolving states, in analogy with
the Schro¨dinger picture states of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics.
In nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, the state associated with a
spacelike hypersurface yields expectation values for experiments per-
formed to the future of the hypersurface, conditional on events (in-
cluding any state collapses) to the past. This suggests that, if we want,
in the context of an algebraic relativistic quantum theory, to set up
an association between three-dimensional spacelike hypersurfaces and
states we first associate with a spacelike hypersurface σ the algebra
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R(σ) = A(D+(σ) \ σ), where D+(σ) is the future domain of depen-
dence of σ.4 If σ is open as a subset of a 3D spacelike hypersurface,
then R(σ) is an open region of spacetime, and if σ is bounded, then
for well-behaved spacetimes, so is R(σ).
In an algebraic relativistic quantum theory, we associated with an
open bounded spacetime region O an algebra A(O). The self-adjoint
elements of A(O) correspond to observables measured in experiments
carried out in O. We will have available to us a representation αΛ
of the Lorentz group, such that αΛ(A(O)) = A(OΛ). If we want to
mimic the Schro¨dinger picture and associate the same operator with a
given experimental procedure, regardless of when it is performed, we
can do so as follows.
Let KA be the dual space of the algebra A, that is, the space
of bounded linear functionals on A. Define, for an automorphism
α : A → A, the adjoint map α† : KA → KA by
α†(ω) := ω ◦ α.
Let {σt} be a foliation of spacetime into spacelike hypersurfaces,
indexed by a time parameter t. Assume, in addition a timelike con-
gruence, or fibration of spacetime: a family F of disjoint inextendible
timelike curves that cover spacetime, to be thought of as yielding a
‘same place’ relation on distinct hypersurfaces.5 Let σ0 be one mem-
ber of the foliation, σT another, related to related to σ0 by a timelike
translation T along members of F . Let O be a bounded subset of
D+(σ0), and let OT = αT (O). Take A ∈ A(O), and let AT = αT (A)
be the corresponding operator in A(OT ). Then, to calculate the ex-
pectation value of these observables, we can either use the same state
ρ and the time-evolved operator AT , or else we can use the same
operator A to represent the experiment, regardless of whether it is
performed in O or OT , and use the time-evolved state ρT = α†T (ρ)
for the experiment performed in OT , since
ρ(AT ) = ρT (A).
In this way, given {σt} and F , we get a corresponding family of states.
We can also transform, in a straightforward way, between states as-
sociated with one such family, and states associated with another,
corresponding to a different foliation and congruence.
Note that passing from a state associated with one spacelike hyper-
surface to another, whether they are members of a common foliation
or not, involves dynamical evolution.6 This is, of course, true in the
classical context as well.
There is a value in reintroducing evolving states into a relativistic
context that goes beyond concern for modal interpretations. We will
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want our relativistic quantum theories to have nonrelativistic quan-
tum mechanics as a limiting case. One route from a relativistic the-
ory to nonrelativistic Schro¨dinger-picture quantum mechanics would
be to obtain nonrelativistic Heisenberg-picture quantum mechanics
as a limiting case, and from there obtain Schro¨dinger-picture quan-
tum mechanics. But the relation between the relativistic theory and
Schro¨dinger-picture quantum mechanics could perhaps be seen more
perspicuously if we can take a more direct route, without a Heisenberg-
picture intermediary. On this route, there will be a different inter-
mediary, which is what Bell ([1987]) calls “relative time translation
invariant quantum mechanics.”
Consider a one-dimensional Lorentz boost,
x′ =
1√
1− β2 (x− β ct)
ct′ =
1√
1− β2 (ct− β x),
where β = v/c. To first order in β, this gives, not the Galilean trans-
formation, but rather,
x′ = x− β ct
ct′ = ct− β x,
Suppose we have two (or more) systems located in small regions a
large distance apart, so that β∆x is non-negligible even for β << 1.
Then what we have is a relative time translation of the t-coordinates
ti at the locations xi. When the systems are non-interacting, ordi-
nary, nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is invariant under such rela-
tive time translations; a residue, as Bell puts it, of Lorentz invariance.
A really relativistic theory, in a low energy regime, applied to systems
localized (at least approximately) in regions that are small compared
to the distances between them, should yield relative time-translation
invariant quantum mechanics as an approximation.
More needs to be said about how this limit is to come about! As
Clifton ([2000], 175) remarks, “since the algebras in the Galilean case
are invariably type I, this limit is bound to be mathematically singular,
and its physical characterization needs to be dealt with carefully. But
this is a problem for any would-be interpreter of relativistic quantum
field theory, not just modal interpreters.”
Having reintroduced evolving states into the relativistic context,
we obtain the no-go theorems in the form they originally appeared;
these theorems can be thought of as no-go theorems for modal inter-
pretations of relative time translation invariant quantum mechanics.
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As argued in §3, above, no-go theorems for modal interpretations of
such theories are relevant to the viability of modal interpretations of a
fully-blown relativistic quantum theory. The upshot of such consider-
ations is: for would-be modal interpreters in a relativistic spacetime,
the strait between the Scylla of too many definite observables, and the
Charybdis of too few, is narrow indeed.
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1Earman and Ruetsche mention Dickson and Clifton ([1998]), Arntzenius
([1998]), and Myrvold ([2002]); Berndl et al. ([1996]) should also be men-
tioned as a theorem of the same ilk.
2See, e.g. Bombelli et al. ([1987]), Henson ([2006]), Rovelli ([2004]).
3I am grateful to two anonymous referees for pressing this point.
4This is a slight departure from the usual way to make the association,
which is to take the diamond-shaped region D+(σ)∪D−(σ). This will make
no difference in the case of unitary evolution. If, however, we want to extend
our account to collapse theories, it is observations in the future domain of de-
pendence of a hypersurface whose probabilities the state on the hypersurface
will concern.
5In Minkowski spacetime, the most natural choice is to take F to be a
family of parallel inertial trajectories, and {σt} a family of spacelike hyper-
surfaces orthogonal to all F . But we need not restrict ourselves to such
choices.
6This point has been emphasized by Gordon Fleming ([2002, 2003]).“[T]he
transition from the physical state of affairs on any one hyperplane to any
other, whether the hyperplanes intersect or are parallel, is always an instance
of dynamical evolution between them” (Fleming [2003], 10).
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